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Abstract
Nation states in the Asia Pacific need to
increase tax revenues but face many chal-
lenges. This article discusses the challenge of
taxation in an age of capital mobility and tax
competition. It then considers two opportuni-
ties that have recently been championed by the
G20, which could enable governments to
strengthen national tax systems by interna-
tional cooperation. The first opportunity is the
establishment of transnational tax administra-
tive cooperation. The second opportunity is the
potential for countries to develop a new mul-
tilateral framework for sharing the interna-
tional capital tax base, which may arise under
auspices of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting project. As Chair of the G20
in 2014, Australia has a key leadership role to
play in supporting countries in the region to
grasp these opportunities.
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‘These are the rights which make the essence of
Sovereignty . . . the power of raising money.’
Hobbes (1651, 2011, p. 93)
1. The Need for Revenues
The power to raise revenues is an essential
feature of national sovereignty. Nation states
in the Asia Pacific need to raise more revenues,
but face many challenges in the current era of
economic globalisation. At the same time,
governments seeking to improve the well-
being of their people through economic devel-
opment and growth often seek to attract
foreign direct investment through lower taxes
on capital. This in turn causes political dissent
especially in light of increasing inequality in
income and wealth, for which taxation—and
adequate public spending—is likely the best
solution (IMF 2014).
The government’s task in taxation, viewed
in isolation from other countries, is one of
identifying, and implementing, the distribution
of governmental benefits and fiscal burdens
that is able to be negotiated with interests in its
own population, in such a way as to ensure a
stable fiscal bargain (Levi 1988). Of course,
states do not exist and taxes are not levied in a
vacuum. The existence of other states, and
of an international economy, affects both the
capacity and the way in which governments
raise money. Today, when passive and active
investment (and skilled labour) is increasingly
mobile across borders, the ‘fiscal bargain’ is
fundamentally changed. The state is no longer
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simply allocating fiscal benefits and burdens
among its own population. Instead, the state
becomes a ‘recruiter’ of capital and skilled
labour, and this changes the entire dynamic of
fairness and efficiency that is the mainstay of
contemporary tax policy (Dagan 2012). This
tax competition between countries is seem-
ingly irresistible to many governments.Yet it is
most likely to undermine the sovereignty—or
policy autonomy (e.g., Mosley 2005)—of
governments seeking to raise sustainable tax
revenues in the long term.
This article first discusses the need for rev-
enues of governments in the Asia Pacific, and
the challenge of the international, in particular
of tax competition, to the power of govern-
ments to raise revenues. It then considers two
opportunities for governments to strengthen
national tax systems by international coopera-
tion, which have both been championed by the
G20. The first opportunity is the establishment
of new modes of transnational tax administra-
tive cooperation that are particularly addressed
at international tax evasion using tax havens,
especially by individuals. The second oppor-
tunity is the nascent potential for a new
global framework enabling sharing of the
international capital tax base that may take
shape under auspices of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) project (OECD 2013). As Chair of the
G20 this year, Australia has a responsibility to
lead in furthering both of these opportunities to
secure tax systems.
1.1. Fiscal Squeeze in The Asia Pacific
The Asia Pacific is very diverse, but most gov-
ernments in the region face a common chal-
lenge of raising more revenues to address
development, demographic and environmental
demands. Except in countries where there are
oil or mineral resources, these revenues must
be raised through taxation. The specific tax
reform and collection challenges differ signifi-
cantly across countries, as does the proportion
of the economy raised in taxation—the tax
ratio, or revenue as a proportion of gross
domestic product (GDP). There cannot be a
single ‘right’ level of tax revenues as a propor-
tion of the economy: this is a political question
about the size, and role, of government, and
the impact on the economy of taxation in any
particular country. Still, where there is a
formal market economy at least partly estab-
lished (a prerequisite for taxation), it seems
that a tax ratio that is lower than 15 per cent of
GDP is unlikely to generate enough public
goods to support the infrastructure and public
investment in capability and well-being that
many people would see as the appropriate goal
of economic development. At the upper end,
while Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) suggest
that the range of 20–30 per cent might be ideal,
successful ‘tax states’ reveal a wide spectrum
of tax ratios ranging from about 30 per cent
of GDP (Australia, United States, United
Kingdom) up to 50 per cent of GDP (some
European states and the Nordic states)
(Figure 1).
Whatever might be the actual or ideal tax
ratio, countries both rich and poor in the Asia
Pacific are in a position of fiscal deficit, espe-
cially since the global financial crisis. This
means that countries are raising funds through
borrowing, and not covering their outlays with
taxation or other fees and charges. Overall, the
IMF finds a negative (average) projected fiscal
balance of approximately 3 per cent of GDP
for Asian emerging economies in the current
year.1
Wealthy OECD member countries, includ-
ing Australia, Japan, Korea and New Zealand,
are all feeling the pressure of ageing popula-
tions and increasing inequality. This demo-
graphic pressure is also very significant in
China. Both pressures imply a need to increase
taxation or expand public expenditures on
welfare and infrastructure, but this is seen in
direct contradiction of the discipline of global
financial markets, which calls for maintain-
ing fiscal balance, reduced government debt,
cutting spending and low taxes to create incen-
tives for investment and work.
Countries in the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian
regions face other pressures on revenues. The
1. IMF (2013, table 1) (Fiscal Balances 2008–2014).
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ASEAN economic integration process, which
is to reach its next milestone in the next few
years, puts tariffs on a further downward track.
As always, lowering tariffs causes a fiscal
squeeze for newer members or poorer coun-
tries that continue to rely heavily on this
source of revenue. The most recent review of
ASEAN integration finds that import duties
represented between 10 and 24 per cent of tax
revenues in 2009 for Lao PDR, Cambodia and
Vietnam, and that participation in the integra-
tion process will cause a drop of as much as 75
per cent in tariff revenues that will require
replacement from new indirect tax sources
(ASEAN/World Bank 2013, p. 42).
Low income countries, including Myanmar,
Lao PDR, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Timor
L’Este and many smaller countries, need more
revenue to provide the infrastructure, education
and income support their people need. They
face the ongoing challenge of generating suffi-
cient tax revenues to finance development. For
some of these countries, resource revenues are
crucial. However, the ability of multinational
resource companies to transfer price profits out
of the jurisdiction poses a big challenge. The
recent move by Indonesia to require the first
stage of processing of mineral ores to take place
onshore is one, perhaps extreme, way to
address this problem.2 On the other hand, for
small countries, such as Vanuatu or the Cook
Islands, tax haven status has been one way in
which they have sought to establish a small
economic base. The global developments in
countering tax havens, discussed in Section 3,
threaten this approach to development and may
not put anything concrete in its place.
2. The Challenge of The International
Where two states assert jurisdiction to tax,
widely accepted international tax rules do
three things: (i) identify the residence or other
2. Indonesia, Ministerial Regulation No. 7/2012 imple-
menting 2009 Mining Law, which required minerals
processing to be carried out in Indonesia.
Figure 1 Tax Revenues of OECD-BRICS as Percentage of GDP
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jurisdictional link of entities to be subject to
tax in the country; (ii) establish the geographi-
cal source or location of income, consumption
or other activity that attracts jurisdiction and is
liable to tax; and (iii) provide a rule for resolv-
ing inter-jurisdictional conflicts and so pre-
venting ‘double taxation’ by more than one
country. These international tax rules are well
embedded in bilateral tax treaties (approxi-
mately 3,000 globally), based on models
established by the OECD and the United
Nations (UN), and in domestic laws. They
might even rise to the level of an international
customary law of taxation (Avi-Yonah 2007).
Fundamentally, these international tax rules
leave the power to tax, and the definition of the
tax base, to each nation state. Unlike other
arenas of global governance or regulation,
international tax rules do not establish a
regime that actually addresses the problem of
how to tax international flows. That is, these
rules do not have the purpose, or effect, of
taxing entities or transactions in the interna-
tional economy, or of creating an international
regulatory framework through which nation
states agree to tax international activity. If ‘full
taxation’ in contrast to ‘non-taxation’ of an
international capital transaction comes about,
this is a result of a happy coincidence of
national tax rules for source, exemption or
credit, or of national tax rates. It is unrealistic
to expect such an outcome in the context
of competitive pressures, diverse country tax
rules and tax planning practices of multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) today.
2.1 Trends in Company Tax Rates and
Tax Incentives
National governments seeking to attract
investment have also undermined their own
domestic tax bases through competitive
behaviour in which they enact tax concessions
or incentives, or generally lower the tax rate on
capital that is mobile. In this way, states have
behaved as ‘rogue fiscal sovereigns’ seeking to
engage competitively in their national interest
in a global economy (Braithwaite & Drahos
2000). In particular, in respect of the taxation
of capital, states have failed to capture tax both
from individual cross-border passive invest-
ment and from monolithic and flexible MNEs
planning tax-effective transactions across
multiple jurisdictions.
In many Asia-Pacific countries, company
tax revenues form a significant part of the tax
base. A threat to these revenues is then a major
challenge to the fisc. Empirical evidence about
tax competition in general and in the region
is mixed (Tahori & Retnawati 2010). While
developed countries have managed to maintain
company tax revenues over time, even as head-
line company tax rates fall (Devereux Griffith
& Klemm 2002), there is evidence that
company tax revenues have indeed declined in
many developing countries and that tax com-
petition harms developing countries more
(Keen & Simone 2004).
Moreover, tax competition in respect of
company tax is likely to continue, causing both
the ‘headline’ company tax rate to decline, and
the maintenance or expansion of tax incentives
or exemptions targeted at foreign direct invest-
ment (e.g., KPMG 2014); see Figure 2 for
current company tax rates. Tax incentives are
pervasive in in the Asia Pacific.3 This has long
been the case, and tax experts have long argued
that countries do not benefit from such tax
incentives, moreover that they generate signifi-
cant opportunities for tax planning so that even
the ‘real’ economic benefit of investment may
not be as significant as is hoped (e.g., Holland
& Vann 2000).
3. Opportunity I: Tax Administrative
Cooperation
The first opportunity that may enhance
national revenue raising capacity is transna-
tional cooperation between tax agencies.4 The
recent and ongoing developments in this arena
are unprecedented. While transnational tax
administrative cooperation has a long history
(Jogarajan 2011), it was until very recently,
secretive, narrow and occasional in nature.
3. An illustration of the range of incentives is at Asian
Development Bank, Regional Integration Centre, http://
aric.adb.org/taxincentives.
4. For a detailed analysis of these developments globally,
see Stewart (2012).
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Yet in the last five years, national tax agen-
cies have taken a path towards effective
cooperation involving the building of transna-
tional administrative networks.
Tax cooperation has to date focused mainly
on information exchange with the main goal of
identification, assessment and collection of
taxes in respect of individuals who have
invested in tax havens. The ability to obtain
information has been essential to the extrac-
tion of revenues that produced the success of
the ‘tax state’ (Hood 2003). In the twentieth
century, many developed country national tax
agencies established systems for accessing and
managing information and the collection of tax
which grew hand in hand with corporate capi-
talist enterprise, in a striking illustration of
successful ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Braithwaite
2008). The technologies of pay-as-you-go
employee wage tax and social security
withholding, self-assessment, company tax
instalment systems, tax file numbers, comput-
erised data matching utilising information
from corporations and banks, and sophisti-
cated risk-based investigative audit have
enabled developed country tax agencies to
collect very large tax revenues from businesses
and individuals. These technologies are
supported by laws that grant extremely
wide information-gathering powers to revenue
agencies, empowering them to demand infor-
mation from taxpayers or third parties about
their own or others’ income, assets and finan-
cial transactions (Seer & Gabert 2010).
Transnational tax administrative networks
extend these systems to the international arena
and involve multiple actors, such as different
government agencies, supranational organi-
sations and financial intermediaries. These net-
works are becoming increasingly legalised and
institutionalised. They fit Slaughter’s definition
of a global governance network as ‘a pattern of
regular and purposive relations among like gov-
ernment units working across the border that
divide countries from one another and that
demarcate the “domestic” from the “interna-
tional sphere” ’ (Slaughter 2003, 2004, p. 14).
In this process, the nation state disaggregates
into separate, functionally distinct parts, which
work directly with their counterparts abroad.
The state does not disappear but its separate
parts—such as tax agencies or subdivisions—
participate in ‘a dense web of relations that
constitutes a new transgovernmental order
(Tshuma 2000, p. 130).
The involvement of banks or MNEs in these
networks is recent, but crucial. The networked
regulation of financial intermediaries ensured
the success of tax information collection at the
national level, and it is this that will ensure that
Figure 2 Headline Company Tax Rate Percentage: Asia Pacific
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states can fully govern on tax matters in the
international arena. The involvement of finan-
cial institutions, in particular, has received a
substantial push from the intricate and slowly
progressing evolution of the US Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
regime into a network of similar bilateral trea-
ties with other countries, requiring financial
institutions to supply information backed by
the threat of a substantial withholding tax on
investors.5
Developing countries have been much
less successful at collecting and utilising tax
information through such systems to generate
revenue. There are many reasons for this,
including administrative capacity and the
structure of the economy, especially the
informal sector or a significant non-market
subsistence economy (Bird & Casanegra de
Jantscher 1992; Prichard 2010). A conse-
quence is that it is also more difficult for devel-
oping countries to participate in transnational
tax information exchange, or to benefit from
information obtained in such exchanges so as
to enhance domestic revenue collection.
3.1 Bilateral Tax Treaties
A web of bilateral tax treaties provides
the legal authority for increasingly regular
exchange between national tax agencies. Most
bilateral tax treaties are based on either the
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income or
Capital or the UN Model Double Tax Conven-
tion Between Developed and Developing
Countries. The obligation and form of infor-
mation exchange in these treaties were fairly
narrow when the OECD model was formalised
after World War II. Since the 1970s, the
models and many bilateral treaties DTAs
have gradually expanded the possibilities for
exchanging information, a process that has
dramatically accelerated in the last decade.
The OECD has now proclaimed a ‘univer-
sally agreed’ international standard on tax
information exchange. Under the OECD stan-
dard, information exchange is not limited to
residents of either contracting state; it is autho-
rised for all taxes, not simply the taxes on
income and capital covered by most tax trea-
ties; and it is mandatory and cannot be
declined ‘solely because the information is
held by a bank, other financial institution,
nominee or person acting in an agency or fidu-
ciary capacity, or because it relates to owner-
ship interests in a person’ (Article 26.5). As a
result of this clause, the G20 made its widely
reported claim, in one of its first major state-
ments about cooperation, that ‘the era of bank
secrecy is over’ (G20 2009).
However, the actual provisions in tax trea-
ties vary widely. Most older treaties do not
contain the provision overriding bank secrecy,
while some limit the forms of information
exchange. On the other hand, some countries
have taken cooperation further under the
authority of bilateral treaties, for example
through establishing informal cooperative
networks, such as the Joint International
Tax Shelter Information Centre, established
between Australia, Canada, the United States,
United Kingdom and Japan (China is an
observer).6 Bilateral treaty negotiation is time-
consuming, ad hoc and linked to other eco-
nomic and political pressures so that these
provisions will be fragmented for some time to
come. The network of bilateral tax treaties in
the Asia Pacific is far from complete. The
ASEAN member states had as a goal to com-
plete their network of bilateral treaties by
2010; however, there are still significant gaps,
while many countries in South Asia and the
Pacific do not have a wide network of tax trea-
ties. Even so, renegotiation of treaties, or the
addition of protocols incorporating an updated
provision, is underway between many coun-
tries. India has more than 80 treaties, including
19 recently negotiated and 23 renegotiations
or protocols to existing treaties, aimed at
5. US Hiring Incentive to Restore Employment Act of
2010, Pub. L. 111–157 (HR 2847), Title V Subtitle A. See
US Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx, for model inter-
governmental agreements and guidance. So far, only Japan
and Australia have signed FATCA agreements in the
Asia-Pacific region.
6. Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre
Memorandum of Understanding, available from http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/jitsic-finalmou.pdf.
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strengthening information exchange, among
other things.7 India and Australia recently
signed a protocol that updates the information
exchange article, and includes additional pro-
visions for mutual assistance and enforcement
of tax debts across countries.8
3.2 Tax Information Exchange Agreements
(TIEAs) and the Global Forum
The OECD campaign for negotiation of TIEAs
has the main purpose of enabling countries to
access information about their own residents’
offshore investments in and through tax
havens. The campaign grew out of the Harmful
Tax Competition project (OECD 1998) and
initially made slow progress. In 2002, the
OECD released its Model TIEA and accompa-
nying commentary; up until 2008, there had
been only 44 TIEAs signed. However, between
the G20 summit on 15 November 2008 and the
G20 summit in Cannes on 4 November 2011,
700 TIEAs were signed, primarily between
developed countries and tax havens. There are
now more than 800 TIEAs (Global Forum on
Transparency and Exchange of Information for
Tax Purposes 2013). Triggers for this massive
increase include the Liechtenstein, Luxem-
bourg and UBS bank tax haven scandals
(Kampen & de Rijke 2008), and the global
financial crisis. Initially, identified tax haven
jurisdictions were each required to sign 12
TIEAs with other governments in order to get
off the ‘black list’. Australia has, since 2008,
negotiated 34 TIEAs.9
The central, and new, international orga-
nisational player is the Global Forum on
Transparency and Tax Information Ex-
change.10 The Global Forum was established
initially by the OECD in response to concerns
expressed by tax haven countries, which
sought a voice in the coercive process of listing
tax havens and requiring TIEA negotiation.
The Global Forum was restructured at its
meeting in Mexico in 2009 to give all country
members an equal vote, even though techni-
cally it remains a program initiated by the
OECD. Member countries contribute to
administrative costs, with the bulk of funding
coming from OECD member countries. The
Forum is open to all and now has a member-
ship of 121 countries, plus the EU and numer-
ous international organisations as observers.
The TIEA process and the Global Forum
directly engage national tax agencies with
each other. However, the Forum is a ‘soft’ insti-
tution in the sense that it has no rule-making or
administrative power of its own and is not sup-
ported by any multilateral treaty or other del-
egated legal authority.
The Global Forum initially tracked and
policed the signing of TIEAs; it has now
moved to a detailed peer review process of
domestic country laws to ensure that these will
enable the practical implementation of TIEAs,
for example by modifying bank secrecy laws
and empowering the revenue agency to do
information collection. The process has been
criticised as too limited (e.g., Sawyer 2011)
but it is unprecedented in scale and depth.
Asia Pacific countries are engaged, but not
fully, in the Global Forum. The most recent
meeting of the Global Forum was hosted in
Jakarta, Indonesia (November 2013). Malaysia
sat on the previous peer review group, and
Hong Kong sits on the 2014 peer review group.
Many smaller Pacific nations, which are tax
havens are members, including the Cook
Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa. However, many
countries in the region have still not joined the
Forum, including Thailand, Lao PDR,
Vietnam, Myanmar, Fiji, Papua New Guinea,
Timor L’Este, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
3.3 A Multilateral Tax Administration
Regime
The G20 has been critical in pushing forward
the most important global development in tax
cooperation, the Multilateral Convention
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters. After it was released in 1988 for
EU and OECD member states only, the
7. See http://law.incometaxindia.gov.in/DIT/intDtaa
.aspx for information on Indian tax treaties.
8. Protocol to Australia-India tax treaty, 11 December
2011, available from www.treasury.gov.au.
9. ATO, http://www.ato.gov.au/businesses/content.asp?
doc=/content/00161158.htm.
10. Global Forum, www.oecd/tax/transparency.
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Multilateral Convention entered into force on
1 April 1995. However, it did not achieve
widespread implementation. In 2010, a proto-
col was agreed that opened up the Convention
to non-OECD or EU member states and made
other amendments to expand its scope. The
G20 was determined ‘to make it easier for
developing countries to secure the benefits of
the new cooperative environment’,11 and this
protocol entered into force on 1 June 2011. A
process was established for a new country to
join, which requires a decision by consensus of
existing parties. Factors to be taken into
account include confidentiality rules and prac-
tices of the applicant country and its member-
ship of the Global Forum. The G20 leaders
called in September 2013 for ‘all countries to
sign the Multilateral Convention . . . without
delay’.
The Multilateral Convention sets out on
request, automatic and spontaneous exchange
processes. The Multilateral Convention also
expands tax administrative cooperation mech-
anisms to cover audits, collection of tax debts,
sharing expertise and resources and many
other aspects. It aims to override the traditional
rule of international law that countries will not
enforce or collect other country tax claims.
This rule has been abrogated in some recent
bilateral tax treaties (including Australia-India
and Australia-New Zealand). The Explanatory
Report (OECD/EU 2010) states:
This instrument is framed so as to provide for all
possible forms of administrative co-operation
between States in the assessment and collection
of taxes, in particular with a view to combating
tax avoidance and evasion. This co-operation
ranges from exchange of information to the
recovery of foreign tax claims.
There are now 66 countries signatory to the
Convention. In the Asia Pacific, however,
many countries have not yet signed. Current
signatories in the region are Australia, China,
India, Indonesia (not yet in force), Japan,
Korea, New Zealand and Singapore (not yet in
force).
The most recent G20 statement is that ‘auto-
matic’ information exchange is the new stan-
dard (2014). Automatic exchange involves
large-scale computerised data sharing about
income and assets of taxpayers on a regular
basis between revenue agencies, and it is not
mandated in the bilateral treaty models nor in
the Multilateral Convention. The Indian Min-
ister for Finance, Mr Gopalan, expressed in
2011 the hope that the Convention would
facilitate widespread automatic exchange of
information between signatories.12 This does
seem to be happening, and there has now been
established an ‘automatic’ exchange group
comprising at present 45 countries.
In addition to the Multilateral Convention,
there have recently been negotiated a number
of regional administrative agreements. These
include the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Limited Mul-
tilateral Agreement on Avoidance of Double
Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assis-
tance in Tax Matters, between Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka. The SAARC Agreement was
signed in 2005 and has been in force since 19
May 2010. It contains a provision for informa-
tion exchange, although that is not as broad as
the Multilateral Convention or OECD model,
and does not explicitly override bank secrecy.
It also provides for regional training, meetings
and mutual assistance between tax officers of
the different countries. This could be a model
for ASEAN countries aiming to further
integrate; it may be simpler, however, for
these countries just to sign the Multilateral
Convention.
Two other aspects of the Multilateral Con-
vention are worth noting. First, the convention
establishes a ‘coordinating body’ of represen-
tatives of the national revenue agencies to
‘monitor the implementation and development
of this Convention, under the aegis of the
OECD’ (Article 24.3). This coordinating body
has the potential to develop greater powers and
11. G20 Leaders Summit: Financial Regulation Session,
Remarks by Angel Gurria, OECD Secretary General,
Cannes, 4 November 2011, available from www
.oecd.org.
12. Minister Gopalan, cited in http://chinaepress.com/
tag/bank-secrecy/, 4 November 2011.
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institutional character. Outside the European
Commission, it would be the first international
governing body properly authorised by treaty
to manage tax coordination. Second, the
Explanatory Report (para (245)) envisages that
each national revenue agency should establish
a single internal division to manage transna-
tional information exchange and other assis-
tance, to ensure ‘direct and speedy contacts’
being ‘the only way to make the assistance
effective’ and to manage taxpayer confidenti-
ality, which is only waived under the condi-
tions established by the convention. It is these
specialist units within revenue agencies that
are networking across borders to build the
transnational tax administrative state.
4. Opportunity II: BEPS
In February 2013, the OECD released its
report, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting, which argued that company tax bases
were at risk of erosion, and that ‘current inter-
national tax standards may not have kept pace
with changes in global business practices’
especially of MNEs. Around the same time,
several countries issued their own reports on
taxation of MNEs, including Australia (Trea-
sury 2013). At the request of G20 finance min-
isters, the OECD released the BEPS Action
Plan in July 2013.
BEPS is a very large project, albeit with a
dramatically short timeline of two years, and
there is not scope to address it in detail here. The
OECD proposes 15 action items, which range
from more technical ‘fixes’, for example for
hybrid instruments that are taxed differently in
different jurisdictions, to broad statements
about improving ‘transparency’, expanding
general anti-abuse rules and a focus on ‘com-
mercial substance’, and reforming transfer
pricing rules and other international tax rules to
respond to integrated cross-border production
in MNEs and the growing digital economy.
BEPS does not focus on the issue of tax
competition by lowering company tax rates or
enacting tax incentives to encourage foreign
direct investment. In the OECD language, it
aims to address ‘gaps’ in the international tax
rules by which MNEs can take advantage of
the different rules of ‘host’ and ‘home’ coun-
tries and can utilise tax haven jurisdictions, to
achieve non-taxation or lower taxation of inter-
national transactions. The OECD is focusing
on ‘real’ economic activity or value-adding.
For example, where countries do not have
effective transfer pricing rules or cannot
enforce them, MNEs can locate profits in low
tax jurisdictions and deductions in high tax
jurisdictions, and can utilise excessive debt
deductions in what is called ‘thin capita-
lisation’. BEPS also aims to address the
‘digital economy’, or what one Australian tax
official has recently called the ‘digitalisation of
the economy’ (Konza 2014), referring to the
transfer of value from ‘real’ to ‘virtual’ trans-
actions, or real assets to intangibles.
4.1 Corporate Tax Transparency
One of the important initiatives in BEPS
(Action Item 13) is template and country-by-
country reporting of profits and losses for trans-
fer pricing purposes (see OECD 2014). The
OECD has adopted this as a goal, although
some studies have been sceptical of what it can
achieve (Devereux 2011). While related to the
substance of the corporate tax base, this is
essentially a tax administrative step that is
likely to be crucial in bringing MNEs to the
table, when combined with the exchange of
information and administrative cooperation
discussed above. One reason might be that it
leads to increased tax assessments in some
jurisdictions, which may then demand compen-
sating adjustments that require negotiation
between governments and MNEs.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that in
2013, the Australian government enacted a law
aimed at ‘greater transparency of tax paid by
large and multinational enterprises’ (Bradbury
2013). The new measure, effective from the
2013–14 tax year, requires the Commissioner
of Taxation to publish certain tax information
of large corporate taxpayers with ‘total
income’ of $100 million or more each year, or
responsible for paying resource taxes.13
13. New s 3C, 3D, 3E of Taxation Administration Act
1953 (Cth), introduced by Tax Laws Amendment (2013
Measures No. 2) Act 2013 Schedule 5.
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The Commissioner will be required to release
the company’s name, total reported corporate
income, taxable income and income tax
payable. These will be the details on the com-
pany’s (self-assessed) annual corporate tax
return. It will be interesting to examine what
impact, if any, increased transparency of cor-
porate tax paid by specific companies might
have on tax law and administration.
4.2 BEPS and the Asia Pacific
The approaches of countries in the region to
the BEPS process and more generally to these
corporate tax challenges have varied signifi-
cantly. The BEPS project involves major coun-
tries in the Asia Pacific, including China,
India, Japan, Korea and Australia. However,
there is no direct engagement with other coun-
tries in the region, except insofar as the OECD
and G20 have promised to engage with devel-
oping countries in addressing global chal-
lenges. In February 2014, the first OECD-Asia
regional meeting was held in Korea to consult
with regional tax officials.14 The consultation
indicated that many countries are very con-
cerned about harmful tax competition in the
region, highlighting the following:
• base erosion through interest deductions and
other financial payments (Action Item 4)
• avoidance of harmful tax practices among
countries in the region (Action 5)
• prevention of treaty abuse (Action 6)
• redefinition of the concepts of resident and
permanent establishment to align the tax
nexus with economic reality (Actions 6
and 7)
• the clarification of the tax treatment of intan-
gibles, particularly concerning royalties
(Actions 8–10)
• base eroding payments via management fees
and head office recharges (Action 10)
• more effective transfer pricing documen-
tation requirements, including country-
by-country reporting, without imposing an
onerous burden on business and tax admin-
istrations (Action 13).
Many developing countries in the region lack
basic anti-abuse, transfer pricing or thin
capitalisation laws, or any enforcement capac-
ity for such rules, that are taken as a starting
point in the BEPS project. In contrast, India and
China are moving fast to strengthen these rules
and are well aware that they need to engage
internationally to address global challenges to
tax revenue collection. Both countries are
actively engaged with BEPS and also work with
the UN on transfer pricing and tax treaties.
The Indian revenue agency, legislature and
courts have in various ways been extremely
proactive in this area, for some years prior to
BEPS. In particular, the Indian revenue agency
has taken cases through the courts that have
attracted significant attention from the interna-
tional tax community, while the Indian govern-
ment, sometimes retrospectively, has asserted
jurisdiction to tax cross-border transactions by
MNEs.15 India has recently strengthened its
general anti-avoidance rule and broadened
definitions such as ‘royalty’ in relation to
intangible or ‘digital’ transactions. In one illus-
tration among many cases, a recent payment
for digital bandwidth access was held by the
Madras High Court to be an equipment royalty
subject to Indian withholding tax; the Court
held that in a virtual age, the physical presence
of a taxpayer has become insignificant.16
It has recently been suggested that the China
State Administration of Taxation has a particu-
lar interest in transfer pricing (because it has
significant real foreign investment in its juris-
diction), the concept of a business permanent
establishment in the jurisdiction and outbound
fees for intangibles and intellectual pro-
perty (Bell 2014). China is also interested in
country-by-country reporting of profits and
losses for transfer pricing, and in emphasising
commercial or economic substance of transac-
tions (Zhao et al. 2013).
14. See http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-regional
-consultations-asia-latin-america.htm for a summary of
the meeting held on 20–21 February 2014.
15. A case of particular interest was SC, 20 January 2012,
Vodafone International Holdings v. Union of India, (2012)
341 ITR 1; see further Desai and Kumar (2012).
16. Verizon Communications Singapore Pte Ltd v. ITO
(2013) 39 taxmann.com 70; 263 CTR 497.
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At a minimum, the BEPS proposals will
require substantial domestic legislation and
enforcement, as well as strong international
cooperation. For example, one of the first dis-
cussion drafts in the BEPS project, on hybrid
financial instruments, recommends ‘that every
jurisdiction introduces a complete set of rules
that are sufficient to neutralise the effect of
the hybrid mismatch on a stand-alone basis,
without the need to rely on hybrid mismatch
rules in the counterparty jurisdiction’ (OECD
2014, p. 11). These rules will be layered and
complex, and will require coordination with
the rules of other jurisdictions. Even if devel-
oping countries seek to engage in BEPS, it will
be a major challenge for most to implement
BEPS recommendations or to influence this
international policy process.
5. Conclusion
Successful ‘tax states’ have harnessed the
power of taxation to raise sufficient revenues
for stable government while also generating
economic growth for the well-being of their
populations. However, key challenges for
nation states in raising money arise from the
international context, in particular individual
income tax avoidance and evasion in havens,
and competition in taxes on capital. The result
is that as the international economy has grown,
states have in effect lost sovereignty over their
national tax bases. At the same time, states are
failing to assert tax sovereignty over an ever-
increasing number and size of international
transactions between taxpayers in different
states, especially within integrated MNEs
across multiple jurisdictions.
Levi’s model of rule and revenue (1988, p.
23) suggests that when factors such as capital
are mobile, governments would prefer to coor-
dinate with interests to ensure a stable fiscal
bargain. In the global context, a negotiated
compromise must include MNEs and other
governments; however the domestic politics of
global coordination must not be ignored.
Since the 1980s, tax competition seems
to have dominated in the international arena,
and fiscal bargains have remained, in general,
within the boundaries of the nation state.
However, the last five years have seen unprec-
edented international tax cooperation, present-
ing potential opportunities for nation states.
On the administrative front, many countries
do seem to be on a path towards increasing
effectiveness of tax cooperation. The new
transnational technologies and networks of
tax administration have potential ultimately to
extend ‘the state’s capacity to govern’ (Weiss
2005, p. 346).
More fundamentally, safeguarding and
increasing each country’s national revenues
will require radically new approaches to coop-
eration between countries in taxation. The
BEPS project is an opportunity, but as Brauner
(2014, p. 59) observes, it ‘presents a mix of
promise and concern’ and faces many hurdles.
Its most promising feature is an explicit
acknowledgement that international capital
transactions should be subject to tax. But, the
contradictions in the BEPS process are
revealed by recent statements of the British
Chancellor, who expressed strong UK support
for BEPS while in the most recent budget
proudly announcing that Britain has the ‘most
competitive’ business tax system in Europe,
including a corporate tax rate of 21 per cent,
enterprise tax zones, expanded research and
development and film tax credits, an invest-
ment allowance, and ongoing low taxation of
intellectual property (Osborne 2014).
So far, many Asia Pacific countries are on
the sidelines of the BEPS debate. Asia Pacific
jurisdictions that have held back would likely
benefit from engaging seriously with the
process. It is to be hoped that Australia’s G20
leadership in 2014 may push this agenda
further in the region to secure national sover-
eignty in taxation in the long term.
June 2014.
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